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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
INJUNCTIONS- BALANCE OF EQUITIES - PUBLIC INTEREST. - Plaintiff
sought a mandatory injunction to compel the reconstruction of a twenty
story building in order to make it conform to the "set back" requirements
of the zoning ordinance of Chicago. The cost of reconstruction was found
to be $343,837.07. The district court denied the injunction. Held on appeal:
decree reversed and mandatory injunction granted. Welton et at. v. 40
East Oak St. Building Corporation (C. C. A. 7, 1934) 70 F (2d) 377.
The court in this case recognized and approved the "balance of equities"
doctrine to the effect that when the granting of an injunction will cause
great financial loss to the defendant and relatively little benefit to the
plaintiff the injunction should be refused. In this case the injury to the
plaintiff, although it constituted special damages so as to allow the plaintiff
to bring the suit, was not really substantial. The decision, however, rests
on the fact that in balancing the equities the public interest also must be
taken into account, and when such public interest favors the granting of
the injunction, the combination of the benefit to the plaintiff and to the
public will outweigh any financial loss to the defendant.
Some jurisdictions take the view that a court has no discretion to refuse
an injunction when a clear legal right is or is about to be invaded and will
not balance the relative hardships. Hulbert v. California Cement Co.
(1911) 161 Cal. 239, 118 Pac. 928; Arizona Copper Co. v. Gillespie (1909)
12 Ariz. 203, 100 Pac. 465; Mobile & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Zimmern (1921) 206
Ala. 37, 89 So. 475; 5 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, (2nd ed. 1919) sec.
1922 & 1944. The contrary view regards the issuance of an injunction as
discretionary under all the facts and circumstances presented to the court.
McCarthy v. Bunker Hill and Sullivan Mining and Concentrating Co.
(C. C. A. 9, 1908) 164 F. 927; Smith v. Stasa Milling Co. (C. C. A. 2 1927)
18 F. (2d) 736; Barker v. Mintz (1923) 73 Colo. 262, 215 Pac. 534; Schopp
v. Schopp (1912) 162 Mo. App. 558, 142 S. W. 740; Hamilton et at v.
Foster (1922) 272 Pa. 95, Atl 50. But in Baldocchiet et al. v. Four Fifty
Sutter Corp. (1933) 129 Cal. App. 383, 18 Pac. (2d) 682 it is said, "It
seems to be the rule in all jurisdictions that the doctrine has no application
where the act complained of is of a tortious character and when the balanc-
ing of conveniences extinguishes a valuable vested right."
In those jurisdictions which recognize the "balance of equities" rule, it
is generally held that if the injunction would have the effect of greatly
injuring or inconveniencing the public, it may be refused even though as
against the defendant the complainant would be entitled to its issuance.
Johnson v. United Ry. Co. of St. Louis et al. (1910) 227 Mo. 423, 127 S. W.
63 (interference with the operation of a public utility) ; Craven v. Davison
(Tex. Civil App. 1921) 233 S. W. 872 (interference with the building of a
public highway); Stewart Wire Co. v. Lehigh Coal etc. Co. (1902) 203 Pa.
474, 53 AtI 352 (interference with the supply of electricity); South Atlantic
Waste Co. v. Raleigh etc. R. Co. (1914) 167 N. C. 340, 83 S. E. 618 (de-
privation of a necessary railroad). The instant case differs from the cases
cited only that the court was able to give public interest and convenience as
a reason not for refusing but for granting an injunction.
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Analogous cases appear in another field of equity. Despite the general
rule that equity will not specifically enforce contracts for the conduct of
operations requiring time, special knowledge, skill and personal oversight,
specific performance of such contracts has been granted where the public
welfare was involved. Pomeroy, Specific Performance of Contracts (3rd
ed. 1926) sec. 23; Joy v. St. Louis (1890) 138 U. S. 1; Union Pacific Ry. Co.
v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. (1896) 163 U. S. 564; Municipal
Gas Co. v. Lone Star Gas Co. (Tex. Civil App. 1924) 259 S. W. 684; Edison
Illuminating Co. v. Eastern Pennyslvania Power Co. (1916) 253 Pa. 457,
98 Atl 652. In these cases, as in the principal case, the interest of the
public helped to give to the complainant what ordinarily would not be
granted him. A. J. G., '36.
PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS-REASONABLE COIPENSATION-WEALTH OF
PATIENT.-Plaintiff-surgeon rendered valuable services to the minor daugh-
ter of the defendant at the defendant's request. Plaintiff made seventy-two
professional calls on the patient, gave her ten treatments, performed two
paracenteses, participated in five consultations and performed a very diffi-
cult and dangerous mastoid operation. Plaintiff then rendered a bill for
$2,400 which the defendant refused to pay and this suit was brought. At
trial plaintiff introduced testimony to show that the reasonable charge for
services should be based in part on the wealth of the patient and in a life
saving operation should be 10% of the net annual income. The defendant
objected to this testimony but the court refused to strike it out. Held,
reversible error, notwithstanding the fact that no evidence was introduced
as to the defendant's wealth or annual income. Scholz v. Mackay et ux.
(Mo. App. 1934) 75 S. W. (2) 605.
The decision of the court was placed squarely on the authority of
Morrell v. Lawrence (1907) 203 Mo. 363, 101 S. W. 571, where it was
emphatically said "He (physician) is entitled to a verdict for the reason-
able value of his services, although the defendant be a poor man. He
is not entitled to a verdict for more than the reasonable value of his
services, although the defendant may be a man of great wealth. The
jury in a case of this kind have no concern with the defendant's ability to
satisfy the judgment." This position was affirmed in the case of Glenn v.
Thompson (Mo. App. 1932-33) 45 S. W. (2d) 948, 61 S. W. (2d) 210.
Accord, Robinson v. Campbell (1878) 47 Iowa 625. The Missouri authori-
ties, however, make one, somewhat tenuous, distinction; in cases where the
defendant has introduced evidence that the plaintiff has charged other
patients smaller fees for similar services, the plaintiff in rebuttal may show
that these fees were made less than reasonable because of the patient's
poverty, and may then show defendant's ability to pay, solely for the pur-
pose of proving that he is not entitled to similar indulgence. The practical
wisdom of such an exception may be questioned.
The majority of the courts in other jurisdictions, however, hold that the
wealth of the patient and his ability to pay is a factor to be taken into
consideration by the jury in fixing a reasonable charge, most holding that
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